This paper is not directed to the question of whether the Treasury should or should not practice in the public sector what the Clayton Act prohibits in the private sector. The paper is concerned exclusively with the theoretical question of whether the Treasury would necessarily receive higher prices by employing price discrimination than it could get by selling the issues at a single price. From a theory of bidding under uncertainty, which seems to apply naturally to the Treasury auction, it will be shown that buyers may be expected to enter lower bids under price discrimination than they would for a simulated competitive auction. If this analysis is accepted, it suggests that the Treasury may actually get less revenue from a given bill offering under price discrimination than under a competitive auction.
Various approaches might be used in attemDting to build a model of bidding behavior in the bill auction. My approach will assume that bidders desire to maximize expected utility, where the expectation is over a subjective probability density function for the lowest accepted bid. That is, whether we are designing a discriminatory auction model or a purely competitive auction, each bidder is assumed to associate a subjective probability with each possible value for the minimum successful bid. Within this framework, three models will be discussed. Model I assumes each bidder has a fixed specified limit price at which he is willing to buy a specified quantity of bills. I intend this model to serve as an abstract representation of the behavior of non-dealer participants in the bill auction -banks, corporations and insurance companies -who act more or less as final holders of the bills. It is assumed in Model II that each bidder attaches a subjective probability density to the price at which he can resell new bills bought at auction from the Treasury. I think of this model as applying to the government security dealers who participate in the auction. Such dealers face not only the uncertainty, experienced by all bidders, as to where the low bid will fall, but also uncertainty as to the price that can be obtained by retailing the new bills in the secondary market for outstanding bills. In both Models I and II, the decision variable is the bid price. Model III is a generalization of II in which the decision variables are the bid price and the quantity of bills to be specified in the bid. From Models I and II, it is possible to show, unambiguously, that an individual will make at least as low a bid (and most probably lower) in a discriminatory auction as in a single-price competitive auction. From Model III, which seems to be less tractable, the case rests with an example in which an individual's bid price is less, and the quantity of bills specified in the bid is less, under discrimination. In this illustration, the gross receipts from the offering are given by the area below dd and SS in figure 1. With respect to the effective demand curve, dd, the seller acts as a "perfect" price discriminator. By contrast, if this market were operated to simulate a purely competitive auction, and if we assume the same bids to have cessful bidders. Under these assumptions, and this seems to be the accepted reasoning, the Treasury receives greater revenue from the offering as a consequence of practicing price discrimination. However, as will be demonstrated in later sections, it is not reasonable to suppose the bids will be the same under the two forms of auctions [3, pp. 391-392]. To illustrate, suppose each bidder, i, in the market, has a firm reservation price, Pi, that he is willing to pay for a unit or lot of the bills traded. Then the "potential" demand, or limit price set, is determined by the ordered set {Pi} arrayed in descending order from highest to lowest. Such a set is illustrated by DD in figure  2 , and corresponds to the demand curve of ordinary price theory. From the analysis below, however, when a buyer knows that a successful bid will be filled at his bid price, he will tend to bid lower than if he knows it will be filled at the marginal bid price of all buyers. If the limit price set is DD, which is the demand under a simulated competitive auction, then the ef- Over time, with repeated bidding in successive weekly Treasury auctions, if DD and SS conditions were constant, it is clear that the unsuccessful bidders in earlier auctions would tend to raise their bids, while the successful bidders would tend to lower their bids. Consequently, area B would approach zero, as the lower part of dd rose toward DD. In the bill auction, however, both DD and SS change from one auction to another. Indeed, the change is sometimes so great that the range of accepted bids for one week does not overlap the range for the following week [4] . Hence, the price uncertainties which lead one to expect dd to be below DD may persist indefinitely over time.
II Mechanics of the Bill Auction

III Model I: A Theory of Non-Dealer
Bidding Behavior This section presents an elementary static expected utility maximization model of nondealer bidding behavior in the two alternative kinds of auction markets. Based upon the resource and opportunity situations faced by such a bidder, it is assumed that the individual has a fixed limit price above which he will not bid for a unit or lot of Treasury bills, in a specific auction. If P is the given limit price and p is his bid price to be determined, the individual's choices are assumed to be governed by a utility function for money, or "rent," U(P -p), if his bid is accepted, 0, if it is rejected. Since the purchase lot size is fixed in this model it can be set equal to unity without loss of generality. Finally, we suppose that the individual would have a subjective density function, f(x), for the minimum successful bid, x, if he were bidding in a discrimination auction, and g(x), if he were bidding in the proposed single-price competitive auction.
With these assumptions, in a discrimination auction a von-Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility maximizer should choose his bid, p, so as to maximize: 
For an interior maximum at p*, one must also have D2ED
U(P p*)f'(p*) -2U'(P-p*)f(p*)
+ U"(P -p*)F(p*) < 0.
The inequality in (2) can be taken as a postulate, or if we assume diminishing marginal utility, U" < 0, and a unimodal density, f(p), then the inequality necessarily holds for solutions p* above the mode, since in that region f' (p) < 0. 
But, if U(P -p) > 0, and g(p) > 0 on 0 p P, the equality condition can never be satisfied. Therefore, as is intuitively obvious, in competitive auctions the expected utility maximizer will bid his full limit price, P. There is no penalty for winning the bid at a quotation above the market clearing price so the bidding problem reduces to one of maximizing the chance of success. This is accomplished by bidding the maximum price P, as illustrated in figure 3 at point C (competition). The conclusion is that a non-dealer would never bid higher under discrimination than under competition, and given the variety of U's and f(x)'s likely to be encountered in real bidders, we should expect a tendency toward solutions p0 = p* < P under discrimination.
The model can be extended to include the case where an individual desires to enter bids for several lots of bills, and has limit prices P1 < P2 < P3 < . . . for each lot.
IV Model II: A Theory of Dealer
Bidding Behavior The distinguishing feature of dealer operations in the bill auction is that they acquire new bills for resale in the secondary market. Their livelihood depends upon an ability to resell such bills, on the average, at more favorable terms than they acquire them. Their profits are squeezed from below by uncertainty as to how high the range of accepted bids will be, and from above by uncertainty as to how low the price at which they turn the bills in the secondary market will be.
For a given lot of bills, we again assume a utility function U(P -p) if the bid at price p is accepted, 0, otherwise, with subjective densities f(x) and g(x), respectively, for the lowest accepted bid in the discriminatory and competitive auctions. In addition, for the dealers, we assume a subjective probability density h(P) for the price P at which the bills may be peddled in the secondary market. The density h (P) is assumed to be the same regardless of the type of auction.
In the discriminatory auction expected utility is now: The conclusion is that a dealer submitting a single bid may bid lower in a discrimination auction than in the proposed competitive auction.
V Model mI: A Generalization of II
The previous models assume that the quantity of bills to be taken by the individual bidder is fixed, with only the bid price a decision variable. Consider now the dealer case where both the price, p, and the quantity, Q, specified in the sealed bid are decision variables. It is assumed that the dealer will retail the entire quantity of bills at a price P, given by a subjective probability density function h(P).
Proceeding as before, expected utility under the discriminatory organization of the market is: 
with Q* given by either (10) or (11), once p* is determined from (12). In the numerical example below we consider the special case of (11) 
Now consider the following numerical counter example to the hypothesis that the Treasury receives higher prices under price discrimination, than if the bills were sold at purely competitive auction. Let the subjective density A h(P) = e -(P -p); also gamma. We note A that h(P), g(x), and f (p), have meansP -1, P -2, P -3, and variances V(P) = 1, V(x) = 4, and V(p) = 9. These parameters are consistent with a presumption that traders would expect the lowest accepted bid p in a discriminatory auction to be below the lowest accepted bid x in a competitive auction, which in turn is expected to be below the price P at which the bills can be resold in the secondary market. Also note that in all three density functions A P is an upper bound on subjective bill prices.
A
We assume P = 100, i.e., no trader believes it possible that bill prices can exceed 100 either purchased at auction or at resale. No doubt it is unrealistic to suppose that the most likely Consequently, in this example, the dealer in a competitive auction bids 98.68, and desires to purchase 2,900 bills at that bid. In a discriminatory auction he would not only bid less (98.48) but also take fewer bills (2,000).
